South Korea will propose a target year for regaining wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States to the presidents of both countries by year-end, after November's Security Consultative Meeting verifies full operational capability, per Yonhap and KBS. Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back made the remarks in a KBS interview Sunday. The Lee Jae Myung administration is pushing to complete the OPCON transfer within Lee's term ending in 2030. "Discussions on the verification of full operational capability (FOC) will take place with the U.S. defense secretary at the Security Consultative Meeting in November and based on this, a proposal will be made to both presidents," Ahn told KBS. "Then, the year X for wartime OPCON recovery will be decided."
What's the three-phase OPCON verification structure? The allies are in the process of verifying the FOC — the second part of a three-phase programme aimed at vetting Seoul's capabilities to lead the allies' combined forces, per Yonhap. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) preceded; Final Mission Capability (FMC) would follow before the actual transfer date is set. Year-end proposal lands as the substantive next data point.
How did OPCON history line up? South Korea handed control to the US-led UN Command during the 1950-53 Korean War, transferred to the allies' Combined Forces Command when CFC launched in 1978, and retook peacetime OPCON in 1994 — but the US still retains control of Korean forces in the event of war.
Why does the timeline matter politically? Locking the target year in before the 2027 mid-Lee-term electoral cycle gives the policy outcome electoral runway, while completing the transfer by 2030 leaves the Lee successor with a substantially-changed alliance architecture.
What about US-side timing differences? "Even spouses have different opinions, so how can countries have an identical opinion on the issue of wartime OPCON," Ahn told KBS — signalling Seoul is preparing for a Washington-side preference for a later transfer date than the 2030 framing implies.
What's the nuclear-submarine track? Ahn said Seoul is pushing ahead with its nuclear-powered submarine project, noting the country has all the conditions to build one except for the nuclear fuel. "We only don't have the nuclear fuel, but we are seeking cooperation and support from the U.S. side for low-enriched uranium enriched to less than 20 percent." Sub-20% LEU keeps the project outside weapons-grade enrichment.
How does the IAEA clearance fit? The recent IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi statement that the planned submarine programme "poses no proliferation concerns" given a solid safeguards arrangement positions Seoul to push the LEU-cooperation request through Washington with less proliferation-regime resistance.
Figures referenced: none. — JudgeMarket.
